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Abstract
Storing knowledge of an agent’s environment in the form of a
probabilistic generative model has been established as a cru-
cial ingredient in a multitude of cognitive tasks. Perception
has been formalised as probabilistic inference over the state of
latent variables, whereas in decision making the model of the
environment is used to predict likely consequences of actions.
Such generative models have earlier been proposed to under-
lie semantic memory but it remained unclear if this model also
underlies the efficient storage of experiences in episodic mem-
ory. We formalise the compression of episodes in the norma-
tive framework of information theory and argue that seman-
tic memory provides the distortion function for compression
of experiences. Recent advances and insights from machine
learning allow us to approximate semantic compression in nat-
uralistic domains and contrast the resulting deviations in com-
pressed episodes with memory errors observed in the experi-
mental literature on human memory.
Keywords: semantic memory; episodic memory; memory er-
rors; schema; rate distortion; compression
Introduction
Given the physical constraints on memory resources for the
human brain, verbatim storage of all sensory experience is
unfeasible. The normative framework for analysing this prob-
lem is provided by information theory, where efficient com-
pression into memory traces hinges on the agent being able to
prioritise information according to its relevance. In informa-
tion theory these priorities are represented by the distortion
function, which characterises the degree to which a particu-
lar form of distortion of the original experience is acceptable
to the agent. While the distortion function is a critical com-
ponent of efficient compression, the theory is agnostic about
its specific form. Thus, efficient compression raises the ques-
tion: What is the appropriate distortion function for human
memory, that is, from a continuous stream of experience, how
does the human brain determine what to remember and what
to forget?
Storing knowledge of an agent’s environment in the form
of a probabilistic generative model has been established as
a crucial ingredient in a multitude of cognitive tasks. Per-
ception can be understood as probabilistic inference over the
states of latent variables, where prior knowledge is integrated
with noisy and ambiguous observations (Kersten, Mamas-
sian, & Yuille, 2004). In decision making, the model of the
environment is used to predict likely consequences of actions,
enabling the agent to find the action policy leading to maxi-
mal rewards (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Learning is readily for-
malised as building a probabilistic model of the environment
based on observations. Following previous research, we con-
sider establishing a statistical model of the environment to be
the domain of semantic memory and formalise it as a prob-
abilistic generative latent variable model of the environment
(Ka´li & Dayan, 2004; Hemmer & Steyvers, 2009; Nagy &
Orban, 2016).
In addition to maintaining a probabilistic model in seman-
tic memory, previous research has pointed out that retain-
ing rich representations of specific experiences is also neces-
sary (Nagy & Orban, 2016; Kumaran, Hassabis, & McClel-
land, 2016; Lengyel & Dayan, 2009). This form of memory,
usually termed episodic memory, is an expensive represen-
tational format, which requires compression. Here, we are
concerned with the nature of this compression. We argue
that in the case of memory, similar to perception, it is the
inferences regarding the causes underlying sensory experi-
ence that is most relevant for the organism, which is precisely
the information captured by the latent variables of semantic
memory. Therefore, the information contained in the latent
variables is what memory should prioritise when resources
are constrained. In formal terms, we propose that semantic
memory underlies the compression of episodes through pro-
viding the distortion function for episodic memory, a process
we term semantic compression.
Empirically, the distortion function of an information com-
pressing system becomes apparent in the pattern of mem-
ory errors that it produces. In the case of human memory,
an extensive body of work has shown that it is indeed far
from a carbon copy of sensory experience. Rather than be-
ing random noise however, memory errors show robust and
systematic biases. Such systematic biases are thought to
reflect rational adaptations to computational resource con-
straints (Schacter, Guerin, & St Jacques, 2011). Making this
assumption explicit, we formalise semantic compression in
the normative framework of lossy compression. This formal-
isation provides an opportunity for a unifying normative ex-
planation of a wide variety of memory effects. Recent ad-
vances in machine learning yielded efficient tools to learn
generative models of complex stimuli. In this study, we har-
ness these advances to compare biases of humans in a recall
task using naturalistic sketch images with distortions intro-
duced by semantic compression.
In the following, we give a short overview of the theo-
retical framework we use in formalising semantic compres-
sion: we introduce the information theoretical framework for
lossy compression called rate distortion theory, define seman-
tic compression formally, and show how it can be approxi-
mated through variational inference, highlighting a recently
developed correspondence with approximate methods in rate
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distortion theory. Then, we argue that semantic compres-
sion provides a parsimonious unifying explanation of a wide
range of experimentally observed memory errors. Finally, we
present the results of a computational experiment which ad-
dresses biases of humans when they are tasked with recon-
struction of earlier sketch drawings (Carmichael, Hogan, &
Walter, 1932).
Framework
Rate distortion theory The branch of information theory
that deals with lossy compression is rate distortion theory
(RDT). Optimal encoding in RDT is based on a knowledge
of the statistics of the data. A central insight of RDT is that in
the case of lossy compression there is no single optimal en-
coding: a trade-off emerges between the memory resources
that are used for storing a given observation (rate) and the
amount of distortion in the recalled memory. This precludes
a single optimal solution but for any memory capacity con-
straint, a minimal expected distortion can be established. The
RD curve,
R(D) = In fQ(RQ),s.t.DQ < D,
which designates the minimal rate for any given distortion,
defines the range of possible optimal encoding schemes for a
given distribution over observations. An equivalent formula-
tion can be obtained for convex RD functions by a constrained
minimisation of the distortion with fixed rate, which can be
formulated using the Lagrangian cost function
L= min D+βR.
Any compression method can be associated with a point on
the RD plane, with optimal algorithms lying on the curve.
Assuming the curve is strictly convex, every point on it can
be identified with a single value of β, which is the local slope
of the curve. Thus, β directly corresponds to a particular point
on the rate-distortion trade-off continuum: for example a high
value of β is associated with strong compression, yielding a
low rate but high distortion.
The distortion term, the cost associated with each possi-
ble alteration of the memory trace, is defined as the expected
value of the distortion, d, between the original, x, and the
reconstructed observation, xˆ, so that D = Ex[d(x, xˆ)]. An op-
timal lossy compression algorithm will selectively prioritize
information such that alterations that are inconsequential ac-
cording to this measure are discarded first. However, the dis-
tortion measure, d(x, xˆ), is left unspecified in RDT.
The most widely used distortion function in the engineer-
ing domain is the squared distance of the original and re-
constructed images, and has also been recruited in recent
approaches to image compression with generative models
(Balle´, Laparra, & Simoncelli, 2017). While convenient, this
is a poor measure of how the human memory weighs devi-
ations from observations: it can be a good approximation to
other forms of distortions at high rates (i.e. when distortions
are very small), but at low rates (high distortion regime) it re-
sults in blurry images severely degrading the identification of
image content.
The information bottleneck (IB) method (Tishby, Fer-
nando, & William, 1999) extends RDT such that it guides the
choice of the distortion function. The IB method introduces
the idea of relevant quantization: they argue that distortion
should be defined by identifying the quantities that we are
interested in. The relevant information is then defined by the
mutual information between the encoding (Z) and the relevant
quantities (Y ) so that the loss to be minimized becomes:
LIB =−I(Z,Y )+βI(X ,Z)
Minimising the IB loss function corresponds to a distortion
measure that prioritizes information proportional to its pre-
dictiveness regarding the relevant quantities Y , which is for-
mally equal to the distance between the distribution of the
relevant quantity given the observed data and the distribu-
tion of the relevant quantity given the encoding: d(x, xˆ) =
KL[p(y|x)||p(y|z)].
The IB method provides an algorithm for optimising the
loss function but it is not feasible to apply to high dimensional
naturalistic data. However, it has recently been shown Alemi,
Fischer, Dillon, and Murphy (2016) that in a variational ap-
proximation to the objective, the deep variational information
bottleneck (DVIB), an unsupervised version of the objective
corresponds to the loss function of an approximate genera-
tive model called the β-VAE, thus establishing a link between
generative models and rate distortion theory.
Semantic compression Efficient compression is based on
a knowledge of the statistics of the environment. We argue
that semantic memory, viewed as a probabilistic generative
model defined over sensory variables, represents the best es-
timate the brain has of such environmental statistics. Further-
more, it provides latent variables that are shaped by stimu-
lus statistics, rewards, tasks, and predictive success. These
variables include lower level acoustic or visual features such
as phonemes, or objects as well as abstract concepts such as
what constitutes a good chess move or melody. In addition,
they contain the information relevant for predicting future ob-
servations. As a consequence, the latent variables summarize
the relevant part of sensory information for the brain and we
propose that this is precisely the information that should be
prioritised when memory resources are constrained.
In our formalisation, observations correspond to snapshots
of the states of sensory variables at a given time or time inter-
val. Sensory experience is then interpreted through inference
of latent variables, z, which are then encoded as the memory
trace:
zˆ(xobs) = Oz[p(z | x= xobs)],
where Oz stands for a point estimate of the posterior distri-
bution. Such an estimate formally corresponds to an episodic
memory trace. During recall, since semantic memory is as-
sumed to be a generative model over observed variables, it
can be used to recreate an experience based on the memory
trace by conditioning on the stored values for latent variables.
This results in a predictive distribution over observable vari-
ables, a point estimate of which can be regarded as the repre-
sentation point for the particular value of the latent:
xˆ(xobs) = Ox[p(x | z= zˆ(xobs))].
Variational autoencoder Implementing semantic com-
pression requires a probabilistic latent variable generative
model of the domain, where inference can be performed over
the latent variables. Inference, that is calculating the posterior
distribution, is typically intractable for complex generative
models capable of handling naturalistic data, thus necessitat-
ing the use of approximations. Variational Bayesian infer-
ence is a scalable, generally applicable approach to this prob-
lem in which the true posterior distribution is approximated
by a distribution from a simpler distribution family. Once
such a distribution family is chosen, the main goal is to min-
imise the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the true and
approximate posteriors: argminφ KL(q(z|φ) || p(z|x)). While
this term cannot be computed directly, it can be shown that
maximising the evidence lower bound (ELBO),
L(θ,φ,x) = Ez∼qφ(z|x)(log pθ(x|z))−KL(qφ(z|x)||pθ(z)),
also minimises the KL divergence. The first term of this ob-
jective is often called the reconstruction term, alluding to the
fact that it penalises inaccurate reconstruction of the obser-
vation. The second term is usually viewed as a regularisation
term, as it penalises complex conditional posteriors. In a vari-
ational autoencoder (VAE) (Kingma, Rezende, Mohamed, &
Welling, 2014), the approximating distribution is typically of
a simple form, such as a Gaussian, which is parametrised via
a neural network.
A further benefit of the VAE is that it allows us to relate se-
mantic compression to rate distortion theory through the cor-
respondence with the unsupervised DVIB. In this correspon-
dence, the reconstruction term is identified with the distortion
D and the capacity limiting regularisation term is identified
with the rate R. The sole difference between the objectives is
that in the DVIB case, the regularisation term of the ELBO
is multiplied by the scalar β, which can be identified with the
β in the Lagrangian form of the RD objective. This variation
has also been introduced with a generative modeling motiva-
tion in the form of the β-VAE (Higgins et al., 2017). It is
remarkable that these separate lines of argument lead to the
same objective, and we build on this connection to establish
semantic compression in the normative framework for lossy
compression.
Distortions in human memory
Consequences of semantic compression Storing the states
of latent variables of a semantic world model instead of the
original observations implies specific patterns of memory er-
rors. Here we briefly discuss these errors and contrast them
with those described in the experimental literature on human
memory and argue that semantic compression offers a parsi-
monious normative explanation for a large variety of memory
errors and biases. Finally, we give a detailed demonstration
of a specific effect observed by Carmichael et al. (1932).
Since encoding of a memory trace corresponds to perform-
ing probabilistic inference over the latent variables, semantic
compression implies that the uncertainty in inference affects
the accuracy of the recalled memory trace. Classical memory
experiments have shown that providing even a concise con-
text which aids the interpretation of otherwise strongly am-
biguous stimuli can greatly increase retention accuracy. For
example in the study of Bransford and Johnson (1972), prose
passages are presented to subjects that are highly abstract
descriptions of relatively simple situations such as washing
clothes. The high level of abstraction renders the interpre-
tation ambiguous therefore providing a simple context (such
as a topic or a hand drawn image) before, but not after, en-
coding greatly increases recall score. Similar results for ab-
stract nonsensical drawings were obtained (Bower, Karlin, &
Dueck, 1975), where a short interpretation substantially en-
hanced recall accuracy.
If the states of latent variables are stored instead of the sen-
sory experience, then experiences attributed to the same latent
state will be confused in memory. For latent variables such as
sound textures, this corresponds to compressing sensory ex-
perience into sufficient statistics for the particular stimulus.
This interpretation can be used to explain seemingly paradox-
ical results in auditory memory (McDermott, Schemitsch, &
Simoncelli, 2013): in a task where audio excerpts have to be
discriminated, the authors found that performance decreases
with excerpt duration when the excerpts have the same sound
texture, even though the key determinant of discrimination,
information content, is strictly increases with excerpt length.
The effect is reversed when the excerpts belong to different
textures.
Due to the fact that the statistical model of a particular
stimulus set provides the basis for optimal compression, the
accuracy of this model affects the efficiency with which the
relevant statistics can be extracted from observations. Ex-
pertise in a cognitive domain results in a better estimate of
the observation statistics and in representations that are better
suited to tasks in that domain. As a consequence, recall per-
formance is expected to depend on how well a particular stim-
ulus conforms the environmental statistics. Indeed, Baddeley
(1971) show that word recall performance increases as a func-
tion of the order to which the words conform to the statistics
of the English language. Further, in a task where chess table
positions have to be reconstructed by subjects, Gobet and Si-
mon (1996) show that the number of pieces recalled correctly
increases as a function of chess skill, however the difference
between experts and non-experts is reduced for randomised
board positions that do not conform to statistics observed dur-
ing games.
Recall in semantic compression is a reconstructive process,
where the generative model is conditioned on the stored mem-
ory trace. In case information about some features were lost
during encoding, semantic memory can complement avail-
able information by relying on the prior distributions of these
features. This results in a gist-like reconstruction of the stim-
uli, where values of not retained features are substituted with
what is likely to have been part of the observation. Good
examples of such false memory effects include the DRM ef-
fect (Roediger & McDermott, 1995), where a long list of
strongly related words has to be remembered. On a recog-
nition test where ’lure’ words are presented along with ob-
served words, the authors find that when the lures are strongly
related, they are falsely recognised as often as the originally
presented words. Another example is the boundary extension
effect (Intraub & Richardson, 1989): in a task where sub-
jects have to redraw photographs from memory, they robustly
recall surrounding regions not visible on the presented photo-
graph, filling in unobserved but likely details in the scene.
Figure 1: Learned representation. Some component means
are presented along with samples. Intra-component differ-
ences are deemed smaller by the learned distortion function
than inter-component differences, capturing human-like se-
mantic distortions.
Memory for sketches In the following, we present a com-
putational approximation to semantic compression in the do-
main of sketch-drawings under conditions where memory bi-
ases are known to emerge in human observers (Carmichael
et al., 1932). We use this computational model to investigate
whether it can enable efficient compression at multiple rates
along the RD curve and demonstrate how it can explain sys-
tematic biases in human memory.
In the classical experiment of Carmichael et al. (1932), in-
tentionally ambiguous hand drawn sketches of objects from
common categories were presented to subjects who were
asked to reproduce these images after a given amount of de-
lay. Two separate groups of participants received different
category names along with the drawings. Depending on the
categorical cue, systematic biases were introduced in repro-
duced images (Fig. 3b).
As an approximation of the semantic model for sketch
drawings, we use the sketch-rnn architecture (Ha & Eck,
2017) and the β-VAE objective. We trained this model on
a dataset containing millions of sketch drawings of specific
object categories that has recently become available in the
Google QuickDraw dataset (Ha & Eck, 2017). To contrast
distortions introduced by semantic compression with repro-
duction biases revealed by the Carmichael experiment, we
selected potentially ambiguous object-pairs from the data set
and trained the model on 75000 drawings of each category.
Although the QuickDraw data set contains numerous object
categories and rich naturalistic samples from every category,
characteristics of recording the doodles preclude a large num-
ber of object pairs from the analysis. The QuickDraw data
was recorded as part of a web browser game, where sub-
jects had 20 seconds to draw an exemplar of a given category.
However, if the drawing gets to a stage where an algorithm is
able to recognise it as belonging to the provided category, a
new trial is initiated. As a result, the data set contains a large
number of half-finished drawings. Another limitation of the
data set is that participants tend to draw prototypical exem-
plars of the category thus limiting the variance of the samples
compared to natural hand drawings. This means that some of
the designs appearing in the Carmichael experiment are not
present in the data set and thus the model is oblivious to their
interpretation.
Since training of sketch-rnn is unsupervised, category la-
bels can not be integrated during inference. We introduced
these categories by fitting a mixture of Gaussians (MoG)
model on top of the latent representation. The MoG model
had 40 components with spherical covariances, where the
number of components was chosen to allow separate com-
ponents for varying drawing styles and drawing methods of
the objects. While it might seem tempting to use a single
component per category, the average of the variations of eye-
glass drawings and those of a dumbbell are remarkably close
to each other. The covariance of each component in the data
is not hypothesised to be spherical, this constrained form
was chosen solely to make the parameter estimation feasible.
While the high dimensionality of the latent space precludes
direct visualisation of learned distortions, concepts discov-
ered by the MoG model can be investigated by generating
drawings from each component (Fig. 1). Drawings that be-
long to the same component are considered close in the se-
mantic representation, therefore the cost of confusing stimuli
coming from the same component is relatively lower than that
across components.
Fitting the model at different β values, corresponding to
different trade-offs between rate and distortion, results in
qualitatively different behaviours (Fig. 2). At high rates, com-
pression behaves similarly to a completely episodic system:
latents attempt to capture idiosyncratic details of the input but
there is very limited generalisation and the semantic model
learned in this regime is not capable of producing realistic un-
conditional samples. At lower rates, recall becomes similar to
a completely semantic system: it leans increasingly on recon-
struction via the predictive semantic model rather than retain-
ing details of the observation. Note, that at an extremely low
Figure 2: Reconstruction at different rates. a) Top row: value of β. Reconstruction: samples from the model with the given input
in the left column. Generation: samples from the model without inputs. With increasing β, we lower the rate of compression:
in reconstruction, idiosyncratic details of the input are lost. At the same time generation improves but also becomes less
variable, at β= 10 producing one prototypical example. b) Blue curve: theoretical limit for no restrictions on parametric model
family. Red curve: RD curve achievable by restricting posteriors to a parametric family such as in the sketch-rnn model. With
increasing rate, compression is more faithful, while with decreasing rate, details are lost, rectangular shaped eyeglasses turn
into more generic circular shaped ones.
Figure 3: Memory distortions. a) Category in-
formation manifest in priors over the memory
trace in the space of the latent Z (red and blue
lines). Combined with the likelihood term pro-
vided by the memory trace (grey dotted line) in-
duces biases: recall without category label (grey
dot) becomes distorted (red and blue dots) b)
Examples from Carmichael et al. (1932). Mid-
dle column: figures shown to subjects. Left and
right columns: distorted reconstructions by par-
ticipants who received the corresponding cate-
gory label. c) Our reconstruction of the memory
distortion using the sketch-rnn model on eye-
glasses and dumbbells.
rate (β= 10), latents become independent of the actual obser-
vation, generating a likely observation based on the marginal
statistics of the data. This behaviour follows from the fact
that maximum likelihood training and thus the ELBO objec-
tive does not give an explicit constraint on the latent repre-
sentation (see Alemi et al. (2017) for details). Actual recon-
structions in the Carmichael experiment suggest that human
semantic memory of sketches in this experimental setting is
best represented at some intermediate rate. We have selected
the β = 0.7 model as our estimate: while capturing the level
of variability in human memory experiments would require
a larger β, increasing β results in diluting category-related
structure, suggesting that at high β levels the sketch-rnn ar-
chitecture is a poor approximation of human semantic repre-
sentation. Changes in the level of compression are reflected
in the increasing width of the posteriors at higher compres-
sion rates (data not shown). Hence, we emulated a higher
compression level by inflating the posterior widths by a fac-
tor of 10, thus increasing compression level while leaving the
representation of categories intact.
To demonstrate that semantic compression results in the
same kind of reproduction biases revealed by the Carmichael
experiment, we trained the model on sketches of specific ob-
ject pairs and selected potentially ambiguous sketches. When
performing inference, we incorporate the category label pro-
vided in the experiment by conditioning on the sketch being
generated from the category. According to the principles of
Bayesian inference the category prior introduces a bias in the
encoding (Fig. 3a), which will also be apparent in the gen-
erated drawing, qualitatively matching the bias introduced in
the Carmichael experiment (Fig. 3c).
Discussion
In this paper we gave a normative argument for compressing
events in human memory using the latent variables of seman-
tic memory formalised as a probabilistic generative model of
the environment. We argued that in the framework of infor-
mation theory this corresponds to using the conditional like-
lihood of the model as the basis for the distortion function.
This correspondence enabled us to integrate recent results in
machine learning with memory research to make predictions
on complex, naturalistic data. Our formalisation can parsimo-
niously explain a variety of memory biases, and here we gave
a detailed demonstration of a classic example in the domain
of reproduction of sketch drawings.
The relevance of RDT for explaining errors and biases in
human visual working memory has recently been pointed out
by Sims (2015); the main difference between the approaches
is that whereas they try to infer the distortion function in a
bottom-up fashion from behavioural data on low dimensional
perceptual tasks, we are attempting to give a normative ar-
gument for the appropriate form and comparing its predic-
tions in high dimensional natural memory tasks. Hemmer and
Steyvers (2009) use a dual-route generative model to explain
the effect of semantic memory in a scene recall task, but they
do not relate their method to compression. In our treatment
dual routes are not required, as RDT provides a principled,
continuous trade-off between episodic-like and semantic-like
memory traces. Gregor, Besse, Rezende, Danihelka, and
Wierstra (2016) explores using VAE-s trained with a gener-
ative objective for image compression in a machine learning
context, and introduce an architecture for achieving different
rates with the same model by conditioning on different lev-
els of a hierarchy, however they do not relate their method to
RDT or human memory.
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